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The Lord of the Flaws
The Autonomy of the Artist and the Function of Art
Reinold Schmücker
abstract  In aesthetics a misleading idea of autonomy prevails: art is auton­
omous because it does not serve any heteronomous purposes. This convic­
tion is deeply rooted in the philosophy of art from Romanticism to Heidegger 
and Adorno. However, it is not convincing because art is functional in vari­
ous ways. It can have a variety of very different purposes – including some 
that the artist does not approve. Against this background, the article focuses 
on a peculiarity of modern aesthetics which has not been noticed so far: the 
development of the modern concept of art has made the category of the mis­
take almost disappear. Works of art are taken to be something given which 
is not supposed to be examined for mistakes but to be explained and made 
understandable by the artistic decisions they are based on. By reflecting this 
peculiarity, the author develops an understanding of the autonomy of art as a 
normative artistic competence, which is compatible with the functionality of 
works of art and can help to clarify the social importance of art. 
keywords  Modern concept of art, autonomy of art, artistic autonomy, func­
tionality of art, aesthetic mistakes, function­related art criticism, conception­
related art criticism
Are artists capable of mistakes? For Plato and Aristotle the case was clear: 
In Plato’s view everything artists might be capable of was imperfect in 
principle; for everything they might achieve at all was an imperfect re-
production of the true – that is: of the idea of a visible object. Aristotle, 
on the other hand, distinguishes two kinds of mistakes which might hap-
pen to artists: the imperfect copy which is due to the artist’s inability to 
depict, as it is expressed by making a painting, for example, which does 
not show its subject anymore, and mistakes which are due to a lack of 
knowledge of the topic, for example if the artist does not know that a 
hind has no antlers. Although for Aristotle a lack of knowledge of the 
latter kind can rather be excused than inability to depict, in his opinion 
also this must be avoided: “For,” he says in the 25th chapter of Poetics, 
“every kind of error should, if possible, be avoided.”1 As long as the fine 
arts were technai, that is cultural techniques the rules of which could be 
taught and learned, this maxim was valid. Accordingly, still today even 
a generally highly appreciated artist such as Leonardo, whose work was 
created at the threshold of the modern Western concept of art, must ac-
cept the reproach that “both in the sense of perspective and in respect of 
anatomy” his Annunciation “shows certain flaws.”2
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In respect of a work of graphic art of today, such a notice of a defect 
would be strange. Who would dare judge a work according to standards 
which do not come from the work itself and which would be brought up 
as if they were a matter of course? In the case of Thomas Struth’s Audi-
ence works, of a photography by Araki, a painting by Baselitz, or in the 
case of Beuys’s Tram Station, what could that be which might be called 
a mistake as if criteria went without saying? Max Liebermann, to critics 
objecting that in their opinion the arm of Cézanne’s Boy in a Red Vest was 
too long, answered “that such a beautifully painted arm could not be long 
enough at all.”3 More academic, but just as clear is the art-historic defence 
of Cézanne by the art historian and exhibition organizer Götz Adriani: 
The decision for this length, which rests heavily on the leather of the trousers 
whose spontaneous white could not have been done better by Frans Hals, was 
necessary to stabilize the posture which follows the curve of the back. How-
ever objectively, as if looked at through the lense of a camera, the seemingly 
distorted scale and the abrupt differences of size are correctly seen.4 
Apologies such as this one show that today even aesthetics understands 
works of art to be something given which shall not be examined for mis-
takes but be explained and made understandable by the artistic decisions 
they are based on. Thus, are artists not at all capable of mistakes today?
Indeed, the development of the modern Western concept of art has 
made the category of mistakes almost disappear in the philosophy of art. 
In the indices of terms of Hegel’s Ästhetik (Aesthetics) and Adorno’s Ästhe-
tische Theorie (Aesthetic Theory) the term Fehler (mistake) is completely 
missing, and similarly in the aesthetic encyclopedias of the past 200 years 
– I proved the German ones and most of the English written ones – there 
is no entry on the keyword mistake; neither in Hebenstreit’s Encyklopödie 
der Aesthetik (Encyclopedia of Aesthetics) from the year 1843 nor in the 
only recently completed German historic dictionary Ästhetische Grund-
begriffe (Basic Notions of Aesthetics) where right after the entry Exotisch/
Exotismus follows the lemma Fest/Feier. Also in other works there is a 
remarkable gap between fascination and feminist aesthetics. And the ex-
pression Kunstfehler (professional error), which the criminal law knows 
for a mistake of medical treatment as early as in the 19th century, has for 
the time being found its way into the world of art as the name of maga-
zines and galleries but not with any aesthetic meaning. This forgetting 
about the mistake of modern aesthetics reflects a strange fact: today – and 
this means: under the condition of the modern Western concept of art – an 
artist is capable of mistakes only in quite a certain sense.
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Of course it is always possible that with artistic work something goes 
wrong. A brushstroke does not produce the desired result; the drill pen-
etrates the stone more deeply than intended; the etching needle fails to 
produce the intended engraving. Every artist will have accused himself 
of having made such a mistake at least once. Then, often he tries to cor-
rect it. If, however, with hindsight this mistake is understood to have 
been a lucky coincidence, if it stays hidden or is not corrected for any 
other reason, if the work is exhibited without correction or left to a pro-
prietor of a gallery to be sold, it is authorized exactly as it is. An observer 
may consider it a failure. The observer’s accusation that the work has 
flaws, however, is made irrelevant if the artist – by word or deed – makes 
clear that he intended the work as it is. On the other hand, the artist him-
self may judge an earlier work as having flaws – as e.g. Jeff Wall did with 
his photography Eviction Struggle from the year 1988 when he worked 
it over digitally in the year 2004. For the concept of mistake names the 
violation of a norm or a standard. However, for any work of art the norm 
or standard according to which a mistake may be stated is – under the 
condition of the modern Western concept of art – defined by the artist 
himself. A physician may produce a professional error because the rules 
and standards he follows have developed as the result of a co-operative 
process and have solidified to inter-subjectively valid norms – the experi-
ences of a number of physicians have contributed to these standards and 
they have been made generally valid by laws and regulations. In contrast 
to this, the artist is alone: also he knows a great number of experiences 
which have been made by other artists in different fields of the arts when 
working with their material – at least as far as these experiences can be 
read from their works or can be taken from statements by these artists – 
but for him these experiences will always be other people’s experiences, 
and it is his own decision if he draws conclusions from them or not. 
Thus only if the artist agrees with the observer and admits a mistake, 
there may be talk of the work having flaws. In other words, it is the art-
ist’s privilege to make mistakes only he himself understands to be mistakes 
because it is his privilege to decide about his works being flawless or not. 
However, the field of architecture is a special case: here, functions are es-
sential which places restrictions on this artist’s privilege. And also the in-
terpreter of a play or a musical work of art, being an artist himself, must 
recognize restrictions which are due to the privilege of deciding about a 
work being flawless or not of the artist whose work he interprets. 
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However if we exclude such cases, even the prevailing law restricts the 
artist’s privilege of deciding about a work being flawless or not only to 
a very little degree. Only extraordinarily bad printing qualities in the 
case of graphic sheets, “the use of colours not being non-fading or of bad 
varnish for contemporary works, particularly wall paintings,” besides 
lacking authenticity, are regularly considered flaws by law courts, which 
may give the buyer of a new work of art reason to have a warranty claim.5 
In respect of the durability of photographic copies being below average 
there are indications of a similar legal practice.
However, speaking of mistakes is common practice with those arts 
that are based on the division of labour or consist of several phases. As 
early as in 1755 Winckelmann expressively connects the existence of 
mistakes in the field of sculpture to the fact that in the course of an ex-
tended work which the sculptor cannot produce alone he must employ 
the hands of his helpers who are not always very skilful with achieving 
his intentions. Today, the relevant goofs lists in the World Wide Web list 
more than 60,000 apparent or actual mistakes with films.6 “Watch Films 
Differently”: the search for mistakes at the cinema – particularly popular 
are so called connection mistakes – has long since become a reception-
aesthetic programme. But here it is possible to speak of mistakes only in 
respect of film-industrial standards – and typically the lists of mistakes 
in the World Wide Web include most of all film-industrial mass prod-
ucts. Indeed, as soon as the director of an incriminated film has declared 
a mistake as being intended, the accusation of a mistake could no longer 
have been maintained. Only the person finally responsible for a work 
has the privilege of getting rid of mistakes by denying them, however. 
Thus, in case of works being produced on the basis of division of labour, 
being an artist includes the right of the last decision. An artist is a person 
who is the last to decide about a work being flawless or not. That we also 
attribute works being produced on the basis of division of labour to a 
certain individual or a group of individuals is an expression of this fact. 
With arts for which several phases are typical the situation is similar: 
here, the artist exerts his right of the last decision either by doing or 
supervising the entire work process himself, as in the case of printed 
graphics. Or – as in the case of compositional music and literature – by 
using a convention of notation he determines what an issue of his work 
shall be like. Nelson Goodman made this latter aspect the starting point 
of his distinguishing allographic from autographic arts.7 
Even at the interfaces of art and reality the result confirms that it is the 
artist who has the right of the last decision about a work being flawless 
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or not: just imagine that in the course of a project by Orlan the surgeon 
did not succeed in shaping the artist’s face in the way she has set in 
advance. If thus there was an action by the artist against the surgeon, a 
law court would have to examine first of all the question of whether the 
result of the operation is due to the surgeon having neglected or missed 
the relevant standards of this operation. Thus, it would have to find out if 
the surgeon can be accused of a professional error. If, however, the artist 
explicitly accepted the result of the operation – no matter how much dif-
ferent it was from the originally intended and agreed on result – it would 
not be possible to speak of as an artistic mistake. 
One might be of the opinion that it is an arbitrary regulation which 
decides that it is the respective artist alone who is able to determine 
the standard a work of art must meet. But it is not. For in ideologically 
pluralist societies, as the modern age has created in Europe among other 
places, there are no generally accepted standards which could be made 
binding for artists. Furthermore, just imagine that artists were really 
not free to determine the standards to be valid for their works. Then art 
would not be what we appreciate (and sometimes overestimate) as art. 
For derivations from socially established norms of art would then always 
be mistakes, and this would mean – strictly speaking – that there was no 
artistic further development.
But if it is true that artists have the privilege to determine the stan-
dards their works must meet, then artistic work can be characterized 
as a nomothetic activity, as a legislative act, and if one considers that 
the Greek culture knew a law of the hands, the nomos cheiron, then art-
ists may be characterized as humans who by way of the thoughts they 
express in written form or orally, but primarily and first of all with their 
hands – with their bodies – give laws: an artist is one who makes law with 
his hands.
Artists are law-makers: by this definition we have gained more than 
just an explanation for the lack of a category of mistakes with modern 
aesthetics. For only this way of speaking of the autonomy of arts makes 
sense at all. Autonomy becomes manifest by the artists’ privilege of de-
termining the norms their works must meet and of deciding about their 
works being flawless or not. Thus, the autonomy of arts is the auton-
omy of artists: it consists of the capability of giving laws to each of their 
works and to their entire oeuvre: in most cases they do this indirectly, by 
cre ating their works with their bodies, their hands. However, if necessary 
they also do this by commenting on their works orally or in written form. 
In a particularly impressive way Beuys’s comment on his work Tram 
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Station, which at the Hamburger Bahnhof museum in Berlin today forms 
a really integral part of the work, draws our attention to the nomothetic, 
indeed domineering act performed by an artist. For, at the Hamburger 
Bahnhof the observer reads the following sentence by Beuys: “Tram Sta-
tion is finished in so far as at first it is a result of this action, that is that 
I said: this thing will be erected in Venice one time and then it will be 
cut down.”
The autonomy of artists shows quite concrete consequences. After all, it 
is said about some works – probably there are even more arts the oreticians 
than artists to state this – that with these works the observer becomes a 
co-producer. Here, things can be put to the test: if the artist, whom we 
consider the primary originator of the work, is ready to let every recipient 
co-decide about the work being flawless or not, then this is really a work 
of which the recipient has become a co-producer. As different recipients 
may have different opinions about the flaws of a work, however, it is rather 
probable that in the case of such a work there would be constant debating 
about it being flawless or not. 
The insight that the autonomy of arts must be understood as the auton-
omy of artists is already predetermined in Kant’s analysis of the concept 
of the genius. However, in the field of philosophic aesthetics this insight 
has today been mostly replaced by a misleading way of understanding 
the autonomy of art – a way of understanding which in the course of the 
past few years has increasingly made the concept of autonomy itself look 
dubious. The glossary of a book on current art, which has been widely 
spread by some thousand copies both in the German and the English 
languages, summarizes the currently predominant opinion very short-
ly: “For art, autonomy means freedom of any kind of being determined 
by non-artistic purposes.”8 Art is functionless and pure, it is no “Zeug” 
(“stuff”), as Heidegger says9 – since the Age of Romanticism this convic-
tion has been deeply rooted in the modern way of understanding arts. 
Already for August Wilhelm Schlegel it was a part of “the nature of the 
fine arts that they do not want to be useful,”10 in Adorno’s opinion the 
potential of art of being critical of society is due to this fact, and current 
art theory sticks mostly to this idea of functionless art – even if it increas-
ingly mistrusts its potential of being critical of society. 
This way of understanding the autonomy of art is misleading because 
it restricts art to a purity and functionlessness it does not have. Art is 
functional in many ways; it may serve a variety of purposes – even those 
the artist does not approve of. For example, no artist who gives away his 
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works and makes them public is able to prevent them from becoming 
an object of speculation, that they are used for decorative purposes, or 
for the self-staging of the powerful. If the autonomy of art had really to 
be understood as functionlessness and purity, it would only be a myth 
which current art rightly so breaks up ever more offensively. If, in con-
trast to this, one understands the autonomy of art as a normative, artistic 
competence, it becomes clear that autonomy and functionality of art are 
not contradictions.
I would like to emphasize six conclusions from our previous obser-
vations:
Firstly: If it is true that by their work artists are unavoidably acting as 
law-makers, we must consider that laws and norms always have a certain 
scope. They are not unlimitedly valid but always for a certain territory. No 
artist is safe from making a mistake while being a road-user or his child’s 
educator. His autonomy does not include his function as a father or road-
user. Thus the artist’s autonomous, norm-giving acting must be under-
stood as a kind of acting which is always already referred to a certain area, 
a territory. Traditionally, the territory of artistic autonomy is called a work, 
and I follow this language usage. However, one might also consider other 
names for the area of the artist’s nomothetic activity: maybe it is more use-
ful to replace the term work of art by the term project, which much more 
than the concept of the work would express the fact that today often the 
scope of artistic autonomy is a hybrid: a constellation of objects, actions, 
events, and an either specific or coincidental environment. In my opinion 
it is an advantage of the here suggested concept of artistic autonomy that 
in this way we are not restricted to the concept of the work. What we are 
restricted to is only the acceptance of the referential and limited nature of 
artistic autonomy: its scope is something constituted by acting, which art 
theory must always newly describe. 
Secondly: If one refers the validity of artistic autonomy to a certain 
field, to a territory which specifically belongs to it, then this spatial way 
of understanding artistic autonomy already includes the idea of the ex-
tensibility of its scope. Indeed, the range of the artistic competence of 
law-making is in principle limited, but at the same time this limitedness 
includes that the range of the artistic competence of law-making is some-
thing which – just as any field – may be extended. Thus, the here sug-
gested concept of autonomy does precisely not include the idea of a work 
which is closed in itself. Rather, in this way the tendencies toward de-
limiting contemporary art may well be explained: as the attempts of art-
ists to extend the scope of their own law-making beyond the so to speak 
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original area. It is so to speak the nature of art that the artist is tempted to 
try out if the field which is subject to the law of his hands could not be ex-
tended. An artist’s attempt to extend the range of his autonomy, however, 
may create conflicts, for under certain conditions he will challenge some-
body’s claims to something. The metaphor of territory makes this po-
tentially combative, warlike nature of the nomos cheiron as immediately 
reasonable as it is expressed by the Greek term which indeed originally 
means the law of the jungle. Even disputes among artists about plagiar-
ism and other matters of copyright give evidence to the artist’s attempts 
to claim a certain territory for himself and to defend its borders against 
real or apparent infringements by other artists. Often, however, the at-
tempt at extending the scope of one’s own law-making may be supposed 
to be due to much more simple reasons: who today makes highly exact 
regulations on how his picture must be hung or stipulates quite a certain 
point of view for the observer needs not at all be driven by imperialistic 
lust for experiment. It is more probable that he only wants to keep his 
works away from the perception-controlling power of the ubiquitary 
white cube or that he tries to make visible experiences possible for the 
observer whom aesthetics has lifted up to be the autonomous subject of 
aesthetic experience, without this letting him stumble through the exhi-
bition less helplessly than before. 
Thirdly: A state who rules over a certain territory needs its claim to be 
accepted by other states. It suggests itself to transfer this fact to works 
of art, that is, to those areas where artists claim the competence of law-
making. Also this claim needs to be accepted by third parties. A work, 
a project, must be accepted by others as an area which is subject to the 
law-making of the respective artist. This fact explains the significance of 
the acceptance an artist’s work meets in the world of art and the public. 
It is this acceptance which secures the scope of autonomy for the respect-
ive artist. Thus, when it comes to works not meeting any acceptance not 
only their aesthetic value is questioned but also always at the same time 
their status as works of art is at risk. Some art philosophers of the 20th 
century (such as George Dickie,11 Terence Diffey,12 or Stephen Davies13) 
have recognized the significance of the fact that something is accepted 
to be art. However, they have not seen that this is due to the nomothetic 
nature of artistic activity. 
Fourthly: An artist is someone who expresses laws, presents laws, ex-
poses laws which he or she has given him- or herself in respect of a 
certain area. If this somewhat hits the characterization of the core of 
that what we call art today, then only now a first aspect of the social 
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significance of art becomes obvious. Art shows that autonomy is poss-
ible: maybe it does not show this to everybody, but to some people; and 
it literally makes us aware of the territoriality of autonomy. For the kind 
of autonomy the possibility of which art gives evidence has always been 
relative: it has always been referred and limited to a certain area. Who 
expects art to express truth and celebrates it as a replacement of revel-
ation may consider this a rather humble result. However in my opinion, 
given the current trend of reducing freedom to an epiphenomenon of 
neuronal processes, the obvious demonstration of autonomy by art in-
cludes an insight which even the lovers of opulent art-philosophic food 
should not over-hastily reject. 
Fifthly: Art shows that autonomy is possible, and it literally makes us 
aware of the limitedness of autonomy. This is one, but only one aspect of 
the social meaning of art. Additionally there is a second, very important 
aspect. It can be recognized if we distinguish two ways of judging art criti-
cally: function-related art criticism and conception-related art criticism.
Let us at first have a look at function-related art criticism. Artistic auton-
omy is far from fighting against the appropriated nature of works of art. 
Rather, it is the sister of a most varied functionality of art. Thus, works 
of art can be evaluated as function-related. However, in this context we 
must distinguish two kinds of the function of art. On the one hand, works 
of art as works of art have an art-specific function – a function which is 
typical for works of art: they are able to create an aesthetic experience for 
which it is typical that it may lead and wants to lead to a kind of under-
standing – a kind of understanding which often is started again and again 
because it will not definitely succeed. Furthermore different works of art, 
however, may have many most different functions and also they may have 
quite different functions for different observers. These functions need 
not definitely be art-specific – they are functions which in principle may 
also be attributed to other things. Such secondary functions of art may 
definitely be art-immanent functions: works of art may contribute to the 
further development of or to reflection on those topics and problems, 
ways of designing and methods which so to speak are the interior aspect 
of the social institution of art. But works of art may also have political or 
ideological functions, they may serve for commemorating individuals or 
events or they may decorate rooms, they may express emotions and ex-
periences or they themselves may create certain emotions or moods with 
the observer.14 As long as there are works of art which serve such or other 
purposes, there will be function-related art criticism that judges works of 
art according to their suitability for certain purposes (and which often, 
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as it misunderstands the autonomy of art as the latter being pure, makes 
much effort to hide that it does so). 
Thus, the critic’s subjective judgement on the question of which func-
tion is how important will always be a part of any function-related art-
critical judgement. Every general judgement on the value of a work of 
art will thus always also reflect the order of priority of the functions of 
art which seems to be appropriate for the judging individual against the 
background of his respective understanding of the world and of himself. 
Somebody will have the impression that a work is successful if in his 
opinion it fulfils a function which for him is of particular importance. 
Such a kind of function-oriented art criticism is in principle not funda-
mentally different from judging, for example, electric coffee machines. 
For example, not every electric coffee machine is able to keep the cof-
fee warm or, if necessary, to automatically decalcify itself. And not all 
of them make it possible for us to watch the process of boiling. If we 
prefer a coffee machine to have a certain function to any other one, this 
depends among other things on how important we consider just this 
particular function to be. In respect of function-related art criticism the 
situation is similar. Thus, that what one critic considers a failure may 
be an example in the eyes of another. In so far, function-related art criti-
cism cannot rid itself of the subjectivity of the judging one. It can always 
only result in a judgement on the question if, from the point of view of 
the way the judging one understands the world and him- or herself, the 
respective work of art is a failure or a success. Thus, art has always been 
a reason for us to discourse about preferences, our ideas and desires, our 
judgements on value and our priority-making. Already due to this it has 
a social significance and function. For as soon as it gives us a reason for 
function-related art criticism, art forces us to make our preferences, our 
ideas and desires, our judgements on value and priority-making obvi-
ous. As the debate on the question if a certain work of art is good or bad 
has always indirectly been referred to the question of which potential 
functions of art shall be preferred to others, it indirectly has always also 
concerned questions such as that of how we want to live and of how in 
our opinion humans should live together and how the society in which 
we or others live should be organized. And as it concerns such ques-
tions, to which every society must again and again find new answers, 
in my opinion the debate on the function-related quality of works of art 
is indispensible. This is also true because works of art are a particularly 
suitable reason for this debate. For they offer us a reason in the context 
of which we are usually not under immediate pressure to act (in so far 
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they offer us a comparably harmless reason). And in most cases they are 
a kind of reason for this debate which prevents us from taking refuge 
to simple everyday insights (for in most cases they are a comparatively 
complex reason which is not transparent at first sight).
Sixthly: However, on the other hand artistic autonomy also includes 
the possibility of an artist making his concept public in a quite express-
ive way. If an artist does so, he makes a kind of conception-related art 
criticism possible which always assumes and respects the artist’s law-
making. For conception-related art criticism is orientated at norms which 
either can be clearly read from the work itself or which have been made 
explicit outside the work by the artist himself. This kind of art criticism 
is made possible by the artist, to a certain extent sharing his privilege of 
the last decision about mistakes with a sufficiently informed observer. By 
making his criterion public, the artist takes the risk that also an observer 
will discover inconsistencies with his work: violations of the artist’s in-
dividual norm of designing. The fact that ever less artists shrink away 
from this risk is shown by the constantly increasing number of artistic 
manifests and self-comments. It gives evidence to how important it is for 
many artists to make their work accessible to a kind of art criticism for 
which they themselves may define the criterion.
However, even a critic who is intimately familiar with an artist’s law-
making will not be able to invalidate the artist’s mistake-privilege. For it 
is a part of artistic autonomy that the Lord of the Flaws may change his 
criterion at any time, and that also he has the last word on how this cri-
terion must be interpreted. Thus, even the informed observer, who has 
intensively studied the artistic concept of a certain artist, cannot claim to 
state a mistake. Instead, he can only state that a work is a failure. For even 
he must recognize the artist as the Lord of the Flaws: that is the price the 
recipient of modern art must pay for the artist’s autonomy. To believe 
that it could be bought for less would be – a mistake.
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